John Dewey’s Social Philosophy by Frega, Roberto
 
European Journal of Pragmatism and
American Philosophy 
VII-2 | 2015
John Dewey’s Lectures in Social and Political
Philosophy (China)











Roberto Frega, « John Dewey’s Social Philosophy », European Journal of Pragmatism and American
Philosophy [Online], VII-2 | 2015, Online since 23 December 2015, connection on 19 April 2019. URL :
http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/410  ; DOI : 10.4000/ejpap.410 
This text was automatically generated on 19 April 2019.
Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right
of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
John Dewey’s Social Philosophy
A Restatement
Roberto Frega
1 The discovery of the original manuscript1 Dewey wrote in preparation of the Lectures in
Social  and Political  Philosophy delivered in China and here published for the first  time
provides a unique opportunity to re-assess Dewey’s social philosophy. Combined with
other published and unpublished sources of the same period,  analysis of  the original
manuscript provides new and compelling evidence that between 1919 and 1923 Dewey
was actively involved in the project of developing a social philosophy that however never
saw the light. This project becomes particularly momentous if seen in the perspective of
Dewey’s struggle to formulate a normative account of social and political life. 
2 To appreciate the originality and importance of the text, I will begin by providing an
overview of the evolution of Dewey’s ideas on social philosophy. In the second section I
will offer an interpretation of the theoretical relevance of this text for Dewey’s social
philosophy, and in the third section I will elaborate on Dewey’s notion of conflict in its
relation with social philosophy. In the fourth section I will draw some lessons from the
comparison  of  the  two  texts,  and  in  the  fifth  section  I  will  propose  some  general
conclusions  on  the  philosophical  implications  of  this  text  for  the  development  of  a
pragmatist social philosophy.
 
1. What Dewey Meant by ‘Social Philosophy’
3 Dewey’s struggles with social philosophy throughout his long career are difficult to assess
in a synthetic way. Social philosophy is not a clearly defined subject, and Dewey’s view
varied quite significantly over time. Moreover, he appeared to have ambivalent views
about having a social  philosophy.  A manageable solution to navigate among Dewey’s
differing views consists in examining the evolution of his terminology, in particular in
tracing the different uses of the expression ‘social philosophy’ in Dewey’s texts. As we will
see, this strategy will bring to light a decisive turn in Dewey’s thought that took place in
the years shortly before his trip to China. 
John Dewey’s Social Philosophy
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VII-2 | 2015
1
4 A look at the ensemble of Dewey’s works may give the impression that the expression
‘social philosophy’ is not used in a consistent way. It occurs some 65 times within the
totality of his Works, and seldom as an object of distinct concern. For the sake of the
present  analysis,  I  propose to group Dewey’s  remarks on social  philosophy into four
chronologically organized phases. 
5 In the first phase, from Dewey’s first writings until 1901, there is no single occurrence of
this expression in his published works. Dewey’s interest in political philosophy during the
first phase of his career is limited though well attested, but it betrays no concern for the
social  dimension.  In (Dewey 1888),  certainly the most  important  political  text  of  the
period,  there is  no trace of  a social  approach,  and democracy is  meant to refer to a
political regime and to a moral ideal. The lack of references to the social as the central
dimension of human life hence of politics is not surprising in this first phase of Dewey’s
thought, dominated as it is by idealist assumptions which drove his interest either toward
the psychological or the moral dimension. A few exceptions can be found in the Lectures in
Ethics and Politics delivered from 1896 to 1903. Here the expression ‘social philosophy’
occurs some 15 times, but the use is always generic, and always refers to the work of
other scholars. A few examples show this point: 
Organism as fixed is at the bottom of Spencer. Now the whole is evolving, not one
alone. The process may be stated as the growing complexity and interrelation of the
environment and organism. The bearing of  the above upon social  philosophy is
upon the definition of the individual, as independent of the universe. Now it seems
to me that this is the chief point of view not merely of social philosophy, but of any
philosophy,  – to get hold of the fact that the world of experience is  a world of
values, and as such is in continuous change, in continuous evolution, and it is only
certain things which we abstract for specialized purposes of analysis that in any
sense remain the same. (Dewey 2010: 1536)
Edward Caird’s Social Philosophy of Comte, while a little off the line of questions we
shall discuss here, is from a philosophical point of view certainly one of the best
things that any student of social philosophy can read. I do not know of any book
that  is  so  good as  an  introduction  to  the  real  problems of  modern philosophy,
because it brings in the relations between philosophy in its more technical sense
and society,  social  problems and also  historical  and religious  questions.  (Dewey
2010: 1891)
The  investigation  of  the  social  function  of  the  physician,  as  followed  out  from
primitive times down, would be a most fundamentally important contribution to
sociology and social philosophy as well. If we take the thing as perhaps the first
view presents itself to us, it seems to be an individual matter. One person is sick and
another not particularly sick waits upon him. (Dewey 2010: 1961)
6 A second phase occurs between 1901 and 1918 when the term is seldom used, generally in
three ways all  instructive about how Dewey began to conceive the task of social  and
political theory. The first way refers to his own and others’ work on education, the second
to the works of the British philosophers of the 19th century, and the third to his own view
of  social  life.  In  particular,  it  is  in  texts  dealing  with  educational  issues  that  the
expression appears, generally to emphasize that pedagogy must take social factors into
account rather then confine itself to the study of the individual. Indeed, through these
texts,  Dewey  insists  on  the  social  dimension  of  education,  of  school  being  a  ‘social
institution,’  that  is  to  say  an  institution  essentially  involved  in  the  progress  and
functioning of the whole social body. By this, Dewey means that education is appraised in
the perspective of  its  contribution to the functioning of  society.  The following three
quotations are exemplary of this use: 
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If  it  seems  unnecessarily  remote  to  approach  school  problems  through  a
presentation of what may appear to be simply a form of social philosophy, there is
yet  practical  encouragement  in  recognizing  that  exactly  the  same forces  which
have thrust these questions into the forefront of school practice are also operative
to solve them. (MW 1: 285)
A  slight  amount  of  social  philosophy  and  social  insight  reveals  two  principles
continuously at work in all human institutions: one is toward specialization and
consequent isolation, the other toward connection and interaction. (MW 1: 286)
7 Much later but in the same vein he writes: 
Our position implies that a philosophy of education is a branch of social philosophy
and, like every social philosophy, since it requires a choice of one type of character,
experience, and social institutions, involves a moral outlook. (LW 8: 80)
8 According to this  view,  which is  inspired by a  reformist  attitude toward educational
matters, “an educational reform is but one phase of a general social modification” (MW 1:
262). Here Dewey pits “the reformist” against “the conservative” and describes them as
two competing social philosophies, meaning by this two competing general views about
the  role  education  should  have  in  mediating  relationships  between  indi-viduals  and
society. As is known, he sides without compromise with the reformist view. 
9 This  treatment  of  social  philosophy shows that,  for  Dewey,  social  philosophy has  to
provide indications of both the means and ends of social reform. On the one hand, it
needs to provide normative standards to define the place of education within the larger
picture of social life. On the other hand, it needs to describe the steps that are necessary
to reach these goals as well as the methods – organizational and educational – which this
undertaking requires. Given the internal connection between Dewey establishes between
means  and  ends,  the  theoretical  discussion  of  ends  is  not  complete  until  means,
processes, and procedures are taken into account. Dewey insists on the “impossibility of
separating either the theoretical discussion of the course of study, or the problem of its
practical efficiency, from intellectual and social conditions which at first sight are far
removed ;  it  is  enough if  we recognize that  the question of  the course of  study is  a
question in the organization of knowledge, in the organization of life, in the organization
of society” (MW 1: 276). 
10 At  the  same  time,  and  inseparably,  Dewey  argues  that  social  philosophy  should  be
concerned with the study of the means by which these ends can be achieved, and should
orient a process of transformation of these very means, perceived as the conditions by
which  the  ends  are  achieved.  Hence  the  constant  mingling  of  philosophical  and
pedagogical considerations in Dewey’s texts on the philosophy of education. 
11 The distinguishing mark of a social approach is the positive acknowledgement of the
entangling  of  means  and  ends,  which  implies  in  turn that  social  philosophy  should
proceed  through  analysis,  critique,  and  reform of  existing  conditions.  Thus  a  social
philosophy intended as a form of reflexion limited to final ends and values is incomplete.
According to Dewey’s views, there is an internal connection between social philosophy
and reformism because social philosophy should indicate means, steps, stages, paths to be
pursued in order to reach the normative goals it sets for reform. In that sense, social
philosophy is seen by Dewey as the instrument of social reform or, put otherwise, as the
critical  moment of  social  reform. Dewey’s  emphasis  on terms such as ‘direction’  and
‘control’ to define the normative task of social philosophy should be understood precisely
in this sense. 
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12 Although in  a  rather  indirect  way,  by  these  uses  we get  a  clear  glimpse of  Dewey’s
normative views: the aim of social philosophy consists in the conscious orientation of the
social process, a process which Dewey sees as being always in flux, always in the making,
hence always in need of  being steered,  controlled,  directed through what he usually
terms  “intelligence,” or  social  inquiry.  Dewey’s  social  philosophy  is,  to  this  extent,
progressive rather than revolutionary. Dewey never tired of criticizing the revolutionary
project  for  its  incapacity to articulate experimentally  how the transformational  path
should unfold, to devise concrete means to bring society step-by-step from its present
circumstances to better circumstances. This theme will dominate the first of the Chinese
Lectures in Social and Political Philosophy.
13 A second use of the expression marking this phase is historical, as Dewey often refers to
the social views of Modern philosophers, specifically those of the British tradition from
Hobbes  to  Spencer,  in  order  to  denote  philosophical  theories  having  a  reformist
orientation, and which address social issues such as poverty, exclusion, oppression, and
equality through specific  projects of  reform. These uses reveal  Dewey’s  philosophical
references  of  the  time,  and  what  he  retained  of  these  authors.  Whilst  in  all  these
occurrences  the  use  of  the  expression  ‘social  philosophy’  is  rather  loose,  and  never
intended by Dewey to describe his own work, they point clearly to a social-reformist
understanding of the task of philosophy. Discussing Herbert Spencer’s philosophy, Dewey
defines social philosophy as: “a theory of conduct which, being more than individual,
serves as a principle of criticism and reform in corporate affairs and community welfare”
(MW  3:  207).  Spencer’s  social  philosophy  is  criticized  for  being  “speculative”  or
“romantic,” by which Dewey means “couched merely in terms of a program of criticism
and reconstruction” (MW 3: 207). This “merely” points polemically towards the lack of a
direct engagements with social and material circumstances in connecting means to ends. 
14 A third and less prominent use typical of this second phase refers to the generic meaning
of  social  philosophy  as  a  theoretical  undertaking  having  society  as  its  object  and
emphasizing  the  inescapably  social  dimension  of  phenomena  such  as  individual  life,
politics,  education.  This  use  is  in  consonant  with  the  Lectures of  1896-1903,  and
corresponds to the use of the term common at the time. 
15 We enter into the third and decisive phase in 1919 with the unpublished “Syllabus of
Eight  Lectures  on  Philosophical  Reconstruction,”  that  will  be  the  basis  for  Dewey’s
conference series in Japan the same year, later published under the title Reconstruction in
Philosophy. In the Syllabus and in the published lectures the expression ‘social philosophy’
appears  explicitly  in  the title  of  the  last  lecture:  “Reconstruction as  Affecting Social
Philosophy,” in a way that clearly shows Dewey’s willingness to endorse as he never did
before ‘social philosophy’ as a central dimension of his own intellectual undertaking. In
the same year Dewey delivered in China the series of  conferences entitled Social  and
Political Philosophy here published in its original version. These texts are animated by a
reiterated critique against the speculative practice of social philosophy, and by Dewey’s
efforts to delineate the contours of what he calls a “third philosophy,” an expression he
uses to refer to his own social philosophy. Methodologically, this third social philosophy
is defined in terms of the pragmatist method of inquiry, according to which: “general
answers supposed to have a universal meaning that covers and dominates all particulars
[...] do not assist inquiry. They close it. They are not instrumentalities to be employed and
tested in clarifying concrete social difficulties.” (MW 12: 188). 
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16 Yet to find a complete definition of social philosophy we need to look at an unpublished
text of the period, the 1923 “Syllabus: Social Institutions and the Study of Morals” (MW
15: 230-373). Here we find the following definition of social philosophy: 
Social philosophy is concerned with the valuation of social phenomena. The latter
include  all  the  customs,  institutions,  arrangements,  purposes  and  policies  that
depend upon human association, or the living together of men. (MW 15: 231)
17 Dewey  proposes  to  conceive  of  social  philosophy  as  the  critical  task  of  producing
normative  standards  for  assessing  social  phenomena  starting  from  the  immanent
examination of these phenomena themselves. Accordingly, the task of social philosophy
is to carry further: 
the  process  of  reflective  valuation  which  is  found  as  an  integral  part  of  social
phenomena, apart from general theorizing. [...] Social philosophy is a technique for
clarifying  the  judgments  which  are  constantly  passed  of  necessity  upon  social
customs, institutions, laws, arrangements, actual and projected. Its subject-matter
involves a study (1) of the influence of distinct types of social grouping upon the
generation of beliefs and standards as to right and wrong, good and bad; and (2) of
the reflex reaction of these beliefs and standards,  upon other social  forces with
special regard to their effect upon the production of goods and bads by these social
forces. Its purpose is to render the social criticism and projection of policies which
is always going on more enlightened and effective. (MW 15: 231-2)
18 From these uses, the reader gets a clear sense of a research program that fuses together
the main themes of social philosophy: concern for direct engagement with present social
ills; an orientation toward non-ideal theory; the search for criteria for validating specific
normative claims; a sense of the relevance of the social and historical circumstances in
fixing the ends and means of social reform, and rejection of a purely political approach to
sociopolitical  issues.  Social  philosophy is  also sometimes used to denote the national
mind-sets of peoples (French, British, German social philosophy), sometimes to describe a
political philosophy which is anti-individualistic, or a philosophy oriented toward the
transformation of social conditions. 
19 Throughout these texts,  Dewey’s critical target is invariably German philosophy from
Hegel to Marx, and the central argument is that social philosophy, in contrast with other
methods, denotes a form of inquiry which concerns specific social problems and has the
aim of devising testable and implementable working solutions. Dewey reiterates his claim
that  social  philosophers  should  refrain  from  excessive  generalizations.  Rather,  they
should help: “men solve problems in the concrete by supplying them hypotheses to be
used and tested in projects of reform”(MW 12: 189). And in the Lectures in China, after
another critique of the classical social philosophies for their excessive use of “sweeping
generalizations,” Dewey explains: “What is needed is to see that every philosophy since it
has a practical aim is relative to the specific situation which requires rectification. We
must think within limits set by special ills and special resources at hand for correcting
them. Avoid large generalisms, and consider specific questions, using the isms simply for
what light they may throw on the special need at hand.” (Dewey 2015: II.11).
20 Analogous formulations can be found in several other texts of the period in which Dewey
deals with social philosophy or, on a more abstract level, with the task of theory. The two
assumptions to which Dewey regularly resorts to define social  philosophy are (1) the
problem-driven and experimental orientation of inquiry, and (2) the subordination of the
task of general critique to science-led projects in social reform and reconstruction. These
two points provide the cornerstone of Dewey’s social philosophy. 
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21 We enter  a  fourth and last  phase  around 1924.  Starting from that  year,  uses  of  the
expression  itself  again  become  scant.  Moreover,  in  the  following  three  decades  the
expression will scarcely ever be used again by Dewey to define his own philosophical
project, a clear sign that he abandoned the very project of developing a personal social
philosophy.  Surprisingly,  his  concern  for  social  philosophy  as  a  specific  intellectual
undertaking declined precisely as his concern for social issues steadily increased, as can
be  observed  by  Dewey’s  theoretical  interest  in  the  social  as  a  general  philosophical
category  (Dewey  1928),  for  social  phenomena,  social  reform,  social  problems,  social
control, social movements, social revolution, social life, and so forth. Indeed, all major
political  texts  of  the  time  emphasize  the  failure  of  purely  political  conceptions  of
democracy  and  propose  the  importance  of  social  and  moral  factors  in  shaping  the
political course of events. 
22 After 1923 the most consistent and extensive use of the term can be found in Dewey’s
several  essays  devoted  to  liberalism,  where  he  defines  and  analyzes  liberalism as  a
distinctive social philosophy, meaning a philosophy with a distinctive conception of the
individual and of his place in society, to which he opposes a different social philosophy,
one that rejects the individualist standpoint of liberalism.2 From this time onward, the
social dimension became deeply entrenched in all aspects of Dewey’s thought. Yet no
traces of a project of social philosophy are to be found any more, sign that the 1919-1923
phase had been definitely close, as is proven also by the fact that none of the materials
included the 1923 Syllabus and in the Lectures in China have been published by Dewey
during his life time. Also the publication of The Public and its Problem few years later may
be taken as a proof that Dewey abandoned the project of an anthropological foundation of
normative theory in order to get back to a more prudent and thinner procedural account,
more consistent with his experimental particularism.
23 Yet this project remains an important document of Dewey’s philosophical views.
24 Before proceeding to describe and discuss Dewey’s views on social philosophy as they
appear  in  the  original  version  of  the  Lectures  in  China, we  need  to  return  to  the
philosophical  meaning  of  the  1923  Syllabus. This  is  an  extremely  important  text  to
understand Dewey’s concern with social philosophy and a decisive one to contextualize
the Lectures in China.
25 In this text Dewey makes clear that social philosophy at this time denoted for him a
normative discipline, the aim of which is the assessment of social progress in specific
circumstances. Dewey wants to carve out a specific space for social philosophy between
what he considers the useless abstractions of  classical  philosophy and the normative
irrelevance of social-scientific empirical descriptions of reality. This space is that of the
development  of  a  concrete  hypothesis  to  carry  on  social  reform,  a  space  in  which
normative claims and empirical description combine in fruitful processes of pragmatic
social  inquiry.  In  this  text  Dewey  adumbrates  a  division  of  labor  between  social
philosophy and the social sciences, according to which to formulate its evaluations, social
philosophy relies upon descriptions of social phenomena that it “accepts from the best
authenticated  sources”  (MW 15:  231).  He  then  proceeds  to  define the  aim of  social
philosophy as ‘ethical,’ by which we should understand ‘normative.’
26 The task of social philosophy, as Dewey will make clear is to provide guidance for social
change. In the Syllabus, written shortly after Dewey’s return from China, he struggles with
a question that had haunted him in the Lectures in China, which is the question of what
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normative standard could and should be used to assess social situations for the sake of
social reform? While Dewey has a clear idea of the role of the social sciences in producing
empirical knowledge about social phenomena, he remains quite agnostic concerning how
social philosophy should proceed in assessing social phenomena. 
27 My assumption is that, during these years, Dewey became increasingly uneasy with the
limitations  of  his  pragmatist  method.  He  began  to  realize  that  a  procedural,
particularistic, and contextualist approach such as the one he had championed his whole
life was theoretically insufficient to sustain the normative needs of a social philosophy.3
Dewey is concerned here, as elsewhere, with the daunting task of deriving normative
standard from within the social situation, while avoiding to take actors’s evaluations at
face  value.  As  he  observes,  “the  standard  of  valuation  is  derived  from  the  positive
phenomena and yet is not a mere record of given valuations” (MW 15: 231). 
28 One of the most original ideas of Dewey’s social philosophy is precisely that normative
evaluations  are  part  of  social  life,  social  actors  incessantly  produce  evaluations
concerning the normative value of social phenomena, and these evaluations need to be
taken into account because of their emancipatory potential and because they deliver the
normative standpoint of agents involved in the situation. As Dewey notes explicitly, social
life is driven by social valuations, which are in that sense a powerful tool of social change
as well as social conservation. Yet he is aware that social philosophy cannot merely take
these  evaluations  at  face  value.  It  should  transcend  social  reality  while  remaining
immanently rooted within it.  Indeed the plurality of  social  evaluations:  “provide the
subject-matter  for  a  systematic  or  philosophical  valuation of  values  and of  ordinary
valuations” (MW 15: 231). Yet how this subject-matter should be handled for the sake of
philosophical valuation is not clear. What is evident is that the mere appeal to empty
universals such as ‘growth’ was perceived by Dewey at the time as an insufficient answer
to the normative demands of social philosophy. 
29 Refusing at the same time the standpoint of traditional philosophy and that of the newly
emerging empirical social sciences, Dewey located the subject matter of social philosophy
in the philosophical valuation of values, a move that clearly requires the social philosopher
to step back from given situations in order to provide an independent perspective on the
valuations that actors themselves produce, but which at the same time deprive the social
philosopher of the traditional tools of speculative philosophy. As Dewey conceived it,
social philosophy has inevitably a context-transcending function as it takes these social
evaluations as its own object. At the same time, it is immanent to the social situation, as
it: 
only carries further the process of reflective valuation which is found as an integral
part of social phenomena, apart from general theorizing. It does not differ from any
thoughtful judgment upon the value of an institution or proposed policy or law
except in greater generality and effort  at  system. It  follows that like them it  is
tentative and experimental and is subject to further revision. In other words, even
the most elaborate social philosophy is itself in the end an additional social fact
that enters into subsequent judgments of value. (MW 15: 232)
30 On the one hand, social philosophy denotes a second order criticism, an evaluation of
evaluations,  intended  as  a  critical  tool  for  bettering  the  quality  of  ordinary  social
valuations. But on the other hand, social philosophy is expected to provide its own social
valuations which engage critically with those of other actors in the process of  social
change. As such, it is conducted from within the social field, and the social philosopher
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has to be seen as merely an actor among others. This is,  as it happens, a fragile and
unstable position to defend. 
31 This tension is not completely resolved by Dewey. He begins by recalling the immanent
character of social philosophy, defining its subject matter as involving: 
a study (1) of the influence of distinct types of social grouping upon the generation
of beliefs and standards as to right and wrong, good and bad; and (2) of the reflex
reaction of these beliefs and standards, upon other social forces with special regard
to their effect upon the production of goods and bads by these social forces. (MW
15: 233)
32 He then proceeds to contrast this method with traditional, transcendental conceptions of
social philosophy, according to which normative evaluation requires the achievement of
an independent  normative  standpoint,  which philosophy has  usually  found either  in
extra-social sources such as nature or God, or in individual states such as consciousness,
intuition,  or pleasure.  These approaches are resolutely criticized,  as is  customary for
Dewey, because in their attempt to avoid the problem of deriving normative standards
from the phenomena to be assessed, they fall prey of much worse problems: “becoming
absolutistic and non-historical, and, in effect, partisan, since they choose their outside
standard to serve the purpose they have in mind, and there is no objective check upon
their choice” (MW 15: 234). 
33 As Dewey is aware, only an immanent approach can help us evaluate a social situation in
the light of the ends that the agents set themselves. It is not adequate, however, once we
set off on the task of assessing the ends themselves. Hence, in a subsequent section of this
Syllabus, devoted to the idea of  normative standards of  social  evaluation,  Dewey first
reassesses his usual views that criteria need to be hypothetical rather than categorical
and experimental rather than absolute. He then proceeds to define social standards as
follows: 
A  social  criterion  must  (1)  express  the  intrinsic  defining  principle  of  human
associations as they actually exist, but (2) in such a form that the idea or principle
may be contrasted with existent concrete forms. (MW 15: 238)
34 This definition comes after a short analysis in which he defines human associations in
terms  of  basic  human needs  that  social  groups  are  called  upon to  fulfill.  It  is  with
reference to society defined in terms of these basic needs that Dewey writes that: “this
definition becomes a criterion when actual phenomena are compared with it to see how
fully they realize or express it” (MW 15: 238). 
35 As we can infer, Dewey sees in these basic human needs, and in the duty a society has to
fulfill them, an independent standpoint from which to assess, as it were from outside, the
quality of a social phenomena. Here Dewey is clearly assuming that social philosophy can
and  indeed  must  derive  its  own  normative  standard  from  phenomena  that  are  not
themselves completely internal to the social situation it has to assess. In this way we
reach normative standards that are independent of the social situation and can, for this
reason,  sustain  the  normative  project  of  social  philosophy.  This  project  is  clearly
consistent with Dewey’s naturalism. Of this standard, that Dewey calls “criterion,” he says
that it  is hypothetical and experimental,  and can be compared with the standards of
health in hygiene and medicine and with those of truth in the natural sciences (MW 15:
239). This naturalistic theory of society can rely upon a functionalist argument – “certain
conditions have to be fulfilled in order that there may be a social  group at all” – to
produce the needed benchmark against which to formulate normative judgements.
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36 Here  Dewey  seems  to  contrast  two  competing  interpretations  of  the  content  of  a
normative standard. On the one hand, he refers to the procedural criteria which define
the  quality  of  human  interaction,  in  particular  to:  “communication,  participation,
sharing, interpenetration of meanings.” According to this view, it would be possible to
formulate normative evaluations of social phenomena on the basis of their capacity to
promote or hamper these specific qualities of human interaction. On the other hand, he
refers explicitly to “the application of the criterion to the five different tendencies listed
as characteristic of different groups” (MW 15: 239), where the five different tendencies
refer to basic human needs that any society is supposed to fulfill, such as reproduction,
material  security,  communication,  leisure.  Here  Dewey  seems  once  again  to  hesitate
between a procedural and a substantial interpretation of the nature of the normative
standard that social philosophy requires. 
37 As I intend to show in the next section, in the original version of the Lectures in China
Dewey  attempts  in  a  more  systematic  way  to  develop  a  pragmatist  model  of  social
philosophy based upon a naturalistic interpretation of human nature which was in turn
based upon the need to integrate what I have called the procedural and the substantial
criteria. In so doing, he attempts to articulate the principle of growth in a more concrete
way, and he does so by relying upon the discipline that, at the time, appeared to him as
the most adequate to sustain a normative account consistent with his naturalism, that is,
social anthropology. And in a very unique way he presented his views as a general theory
of conflict, that for him provided the theoretical ground of social philosophy.
 
2. In Search of a Solid Ground for Social Philosophy
38 The previous historical reconstruction has shown that the Lectures in China appear to be
one of the rare documents in which Dewey elaborated a systematic account of his social
philosophy. Until today, the use of this text for a serious reconstruction of Dewey’s views
has been hampered by the ambiguous editorial status of this text. With the discovery of
the manuscript originally typewritten by Dewey as a material support for these lectures,
we are now in a much better position to assess Dewey’s views on social philosophy. We
are lucky that the first four lectures have been preserved in their integral form, so that a
close  comparison  between  them and  the  previously  published  version  can  be  easily
achieved. 
39 While at first sight the two texts appear to be clearly and directly connected, so that there
can be no doubt that they are two versions of the same text, there are nevertheless
significant divergences. For once, we can safely make the assumption that Dewey did not
read the text he prepared to his audience, as it is clear that this text was not written to be
read but rather as a basis for the talk. Yet there are significant stylistic and semantic
differences which it is difficult to impute to the distance which may have been introduced
by Dewey between the written and the spoken word, as they clearly betray a different
philosophical standpoint on some crucial philosophical themes. 
40 As we have seen, to understand this text we have to contextualize it in this short and
intense phase of theoretical reflection on social philosophy, a time during which Dewey
was concerned with the possibility of developing a normative account of social life that
might provide the theoretical background for the kind of social analyses he considered to
be the backbone of the new ‘third’ philosophy he advocated. We should also consider that
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the Lectures in China were delivered only a year after he delivered the series of lectures
published later as Human Nature and Conduct, the text in which Dewey presents his views
on social anthropology. Similar attempts at rooting a normative analysis of social life in a
naturalistic theory of action were pursued at the same time by authors close to Dewey
such as William I. Thomas and Thorstein Veblen (Kilpinen 2000). These are also the years
in which Dewey’s intellectual collaboration with the cultural anthropologist Franz Boas
was at its most intense (Torres Colon & Hobbs 2015). 
41 In his search for more stringent normative criteria for advancing social philosophy as a
project  of  normative  evaluation,  Dewey  sought  solutions  in  the  anthropological
foundation of social life. This move was nothing new in the context of Dewey’s lasting
commitment to naturalism. Indeed, this has been the leading assumption of his social and
political  philosophy.  Nevertheless,  late  in  1932,  for  example,  while  describing  the
normative ideal of democracy, he explains that: 
it  simply  projects  to  their  logical  and  practical  limit  forces  inherent  in  human
nature and already embodied to some extent in human nature. It serves accordingly
as a basis for criticism of institutions as they exist and of plans of betterment. (LW
7: 349)
42 As can be seen from this passage, which echoes many others of this time, normative social
ideas have a direct connection with human nature.
43 The novelty present in the Lectures in China concerns rather the more explicit intention of
accounting for normative standards in terms of a basic set of universal human needs that
each group must fulfill. Dewey’s reliance upon the language of needs and interests which
characterizes  the  original  Lectures  in  China is  fully  consistent  with  his  anthropology.
However, what may surprise the reader is the explicit reference to basic and universal
needs as a benchmark for his normative social  philosophy. Dewey’s statements about
human nature are elsewhere more elusive, and the vocabulary of cultural variation is
generally preferred to that  of  universal  invariants.  We all  know Dewey’s  provocative
claim that: “in conduct the acquired is the primitive” (MW 14: 65). Yet, as he reminds us,
what is acquired is not the impulse in itself, but rather its meaning.
44 It  is  important to see that the Lectures in China do not violate this basic postulate of
Dewey’s anthropology. Yet in this text he takes a different tack. He attempts to provide a
taxonomy of the basic needs that qualify human nature before their cultural articulation,
and to use them as a normative benchmark for social analysis. To fulfill this task, rather
than focusing upon how these basic needs are differently shaped according to social
circumstances, Dewey chooses to emphasize a supposedly universal trait, which is to say
that the satisfaction of these basic needs can be achieved only through associated action. Society
in general,  and group life in particular,  can therefore be assessed according to their
capacity to fulfill this universal task. This social-theoretic claim provides the means by
which the anthropological invariant is contextually articulated. 
45 While the idea that  the satisfaction of  human needs is  always socially mediated is  a
classical theme of Dewey’s philosophy, a major point emphasized by the Lectures in China
concerns the necessary function of groups as well as of institutions in fulfilling this task.
This  argument  will  be  formulated once  again  in the  1923  Syllabus, although on that
occasion Dewey will refrain from drawing normative implications from it.
46 Is Dewey here assuming a biological definition of human essence defined in terms of its
“native impulses” – something that would patently contradict his most basic ideas, in
particular his criticism of transcendental approaches to social philosophy? I’m persuaded
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that the basic ideas presented in the Lectures in China do not contradict Dewey’s basic
philosophical principles. In this text Dewey leaves completely undetermined the question
of how the diversity of social conditions influence the ways in which impulses consolidate
into  habits,  precisely  because  his  interest  is  elsewhere.  In  the  1923  Syllabus Dewey
explains that, whereas needs are limited and basic, their social expression takes shape as
‘wants,’  which vary according to social  circumstances and:  “may become indefinitely
diversified  and  complex”  (MW  15:  249).  Yet  in  the  Lectures  in  China, Dewey  is  not
concerned with the influence of the environment on human character, but rather with
how the struggle to fulfill basic needs produces new forms of human association, hence
with its genealogical function in the history of human beings. In the context of his social
philosophy, this assumption is then used to ground a general theory of conflict.  This
notion, that Human Nature and Conduct puts at the heart of human individual life, is now
presented as the basic trait of social life. As we may expect, Dewey will come up with a
theoretically general and ambitious theory of social conflict, as the basis of which he will
posit his social anthropology. This surprising connection dominates the entire analysis of
social conflict and social reform found in Lectures 3 and 4.
 
3. Dewey’s Theory of Social Conflict
47 Dewey’s  Lectures  in  China have been generally  considered one of  the most  important
documents for understanding Dewey’s theory of conflict. Some have seen in this text the
confirmation of a form of political radicalism based on a quasi-Marxist interpretation of
social change as rooted in the conflict among social groups struggling for recognition and
for  the  appropriation  of  material  resources.  Taken  from  the  history  of  the  labor
movement,  along  with  a  whole  array  of  sentences  referring  to  relations  of  group
domination and to social groups oppressing other social groups, Dewey’s examples could
indeed have given the impression that here for the first and probably the last time he
embraced a theory of society that could be easily reconciled with the paradigm of class
struggle, and with the assumption that in the end material conditions of inequality play a
central role in social dynamics of conflict. 
48 As  I  intend  to  show,  this  interpretation  of  Dewey’s  social  philosophy  appears  to  be
unsupported by textual evidence, once we compare the two versions of the text. Not only
does the original manuscript written by Dewey not warrant such an interpretation, but it
also shows that this interpretation was not warranted even by the version of the lectures
known till  today.  In particular,  the newly discovered manuscript shows that Dewey’s
theory of conflict is much more abstract and ambitious than is usually believed. Indeed,
only by reaching a very high level of abstraction he could transform the notion of conflict
into one of the pillars of his social philosophy. 
49 Dewey begins his analysis of social conflict with a definition that, as I will show, is full of
ambiguities: 
The significant conflicts are conflicts of groups, classes, factions, parties, peoples. 
A  group  is  a  number  of  people  associated  together  for  some  purposes,  some
common activity that holds them. (Dewey 2015: III.1)
50 What remains unclear in this definition is the nature of groups. What kind of groups is
Dewey referring to? What are the criteria which preside over the genesis of groups? Are
they determined according to general external circumstances such as economic standing,
occupation, or education or by intrinsic traits such as gender or race? 
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51 To understand the real import of Dewey’s social philosophy, we need first to clarify what
he has in mind when he speaks of groups. Examination of the original manuscript offers
sufficient evidence that Dewey’s theory of groups is very different from contemporary
social theories of groups. While of course on several occasions Dewey refers to groups
loosely as any association of individuals sharing some interest in common, when it comes
to the theory of conflict, he has in mind a very specific idea of the group, one deriving
from his functional understanding of social life. 
52 According to the view introduced by Dewey in his Lectures, a group denotes a specific
form of social organization qualified by its capacity to satisfy a specific basic human need.
This  idea  is  also  formulated  by  Dewey  in  the  1923  Syllabus, where  he  states  that:
“Fundamental  human  needs  are  the  basis  of  association  or  group  formation  and
characteristic interests reflect these need” (MW 15: 236). 
53 Here Dewey identifies five basic human needs to which he explicitly associates five types
of group organization: (1) support and sustenance are fulfilled by industrial groups; (2)
protection and security are fulfilled by ecclesiastical, military, and political groups; (3)
reproduction is granted by family; (4) recreation and leisure is fulfilled by clubs and other
types of voluntary associations, and (5) language and sociability are related to schools and
academies. As in the Lectures in China, here too Dewey acknowledges that, historically, a
given group may take on different functions, and that individuals belong to a plurality of
groups. But the notion of the group as such is defined, in nearly ideal typical ways, in
terms of its functional correlation with the basic human need it is called upon to fulfill. 
54 This notion of the group obtains its full theoretical import in the context of Dewey’s
theory of conflict. Particularly in the Lectures in China, where Dewey is concerned with the
ambitious task of developing a new pragmatist social philosophy, in order for this notion
to  fulfill  its  foundational  task,  the  idea  of  conflict  is  endowed with  a  more  general
meaning. In particular, Dewey refrains from the usual interest-based conception. Rather,
he defines conflict in terms of a contrast taking place not among social groups, but among
competing normative principles which impose incompatible injunctions upon reality. In
the Ethics Dewey will rely upon the same strategy to define the nature of moral conflict in
its  most general  terms as a conflict  among the competing incompatible principles of
virtue, the right, and the good rather than as a lower order conflict among competing
goods or among competing rights.
55 Human beings have universal basic needs which refer to material as well  as spiritual
conditions of survival and self-realization. In the Lectures in China these needs are often
referred to as ‘interests’: 
Human nature has a variety of interests to be served, a number of types of impulses
that have to be expressed, or instincts that form needs to be satisfied, and about
each one of  the  more fundamental  of  these  some form of  association,  of  living
together  as  or  of  acting  together  continuously  or  repeatedly  and  regularly  (as
distinct from mere chance and transient contacts). (Dewey 2015: III.2)
56 As is clear from this text, the term ‘interest’ refers neither to material interests nor to
individual preferences. Rather, it is a synonym of need, impulse, or even instinct. It refers
to the basic structure of human nature. Here and in the Syllabus Dewey refers explicitly to
basic interests which are common to all human beings. The recurrent list includes the
following: reproduction and affective security; material comfort; spiritual guidance and
security;  intellectual  curiosity,  and  artistic  expression.  This  typological  approach  is
fundamental  to understanding  Dewey’s  theory  of  conflict  and  its  place  in  his  social
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philosophy. There are types of interests which typically find expression in given types of
human association. The family, the church, the state, the business enterprise, the school,
are all forms of institution which have developed to better fulfill specific human needs. 
57 The real  innovation introduced by the Lectures  in China is  the sociological  hypothesis
concerning the  relationship  between basic  human needs  and social  life.  Here  Dewey
formulates the following hypothesis. Given their social nature, human beings can satisfy
their basic needs only by associating in groups. Groups evolve functionally according to
their capacity to fulfill one or another basic human need and they develop institutions
which are more or less effective. In the evolutionary perspective taken by Dewey, each
basic human need has been best fulfilled by specific societal forms, among which Dewey
cites the family, the business, religion, the state, and science. 
58 In the context of this theoretical framework, Dewey can then define the object of social
philosophy as the study of how a given society succeeds or fails to satisfy these basic
human needs through a process of sociological differentiation and institution building.
This functionalist theory of associations explains the genesis of the basic forms of social
life as the result of human attempts to satisfy these basic social needs. As a consequence,
associations and groups can be classified according to which interest they serve,  and
evaluated according to their capacity to fulfill that task. This is the basic idea behind
Dewey’s group-based theory of social life. As a consequence, in this context, by groups
Dewey does not refer to social aggregates composed on the basis of whatever specific
interest, as will be the case in his theory of publics. Here Dewey is referring to a very
specific kind of interest, and one which is universal because common to all human beings.
59 The further theoretical assumption which characterizes Dewey’s theory of conflict is that
once a group succeeds in satisfying a basic human need, it tends to impose the successful
organizational logic upon the whole of social life. In that way, the social solution to satisfy
a basic need transforms itself into a hegemonic attempt to organize the whole society
according  to  its  own  logic.  Dewey  takes  the  example  of  families  and  kins,  an
organizational model that has emerged in order to promote human reproduction, and
that has progressively expanded to the other social spheres subjecting all  spheres of
social life to the principle of kinship. Similarly, Dewey points to the historical tendency of
the Church to interpret all dimensions of human experience in terms of its own driving
principle, which is that of spiritual salvation through renunciation of worldly goods. Here
too, Dewey emphasizes the negative consequences produced by the generalization of the
religious group logic beyond its legitimate sphere of influence.
60 Against this background, group conflict are understood as mere instantiations of a more
radical type of conflict,  one taking place among competing and irreducible principles
struggling for the organization of social life. Conflict among groups is relevant at this
explanatory level  only insofar as it  reflects and enacts in reality this deeper conflict
among basic  needs.  Politicians,  capitalists,  priests,  scientists,  patriarchs represent  for
Dewey  types  of  groups  which  may  come  into  conflict  one  against  the  other.  The
paradigmatic  type of  conflict  Dewey has in mind is  not  that  between capitalists  and
workers for the redistribution of profit, but rather that between the Church and science
concerning the legitimate source of epistemic authority. 
61 This is the basic normative argument which sustains Dewey’s theory of conflict and which
provides the basis for developing a normative standard for assessing the quality of social
phenomena. Indeed, as the consequence of the failed fulfillment in these basic needs
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reverberate  into  human  beings’  lack  of  flourishing  and  into  societies’  decline,  the
normative  standard  of  a  good  society  is  defined  by  the  integrated  and  successful
satisfaction of all these basic needs. Hence a society in which there is a plurality of forms
of association, each consistent with one specific interest and globally capable of satisfying
them all.
62 Here we find the positive norm underlying Dewey’s  social  philosophy.  A functioning
society is one that is  successfully integrated,  in which all  these needs are taken into
account. As Dewey writes: 
We can frame in imagination a picture in which there is an equal proportionate
development of all these forms of associated life, where they interact freely with
one another,  and where the results  of  each one contribute  to  the richness  and
significance of every other, where family relations assist equally the cooperation of
men in science, art, religion and public life, where association for production and
sale of goods enriches not merely materially but morally and intellectually forms
and modes of human intercourse – where in short there is mutual stimulation and
support and free passage of significant results from one to another. (Dewey 2015:
III.3)
63 Dewey defines  here  the  basic  forms of  a  successful  social  organization as  “universal
modes of union and association,” because these modes of association depend directly
from universal assumptions concerning our anthropological constitution. The normative
ideal of an appropriate form of social organization is derived from a hypothesis about
human constitution, and particularly about their basic interests and needs. 
64 Failure to achieve this state of social integration produces what for Dewey are the real
marks of social failure, which is to say ‘division’ and ‘conflict.’ Division, and especially
conflict,  are  defined  in  terms  of  the  failure  of  social  integration.  In  its  turn,  social
integration is conceived in terms of equilibrate satisfaction of all the basic human needs,
a condition that to be achieved requires the successful integration of the social groups
which most concur to this satisfaction. Hence a society fails to fulfill its main task when it
fails  to  prevent  one  form  of  association  to  predominate  over  all  others.  In  these
conditions, a principle of social organization and hence the social group that represents it
may succeed in ‘colonizing’ the rest of society, imposing its logic upon all the spheres of
social life. This kind of colonization is not properly pathological, insofar as for Dewey the
tendency of each principle to impose itself over the others is natural and inevitable. It is a
tendency  inscribed  within  social  life,  a  tendency,  however,  against  which  we  have
constantly  to  strive.  Normative  reconstruction  is  the  endless  task  of  countering  the
negative consequences associated with this tendency. 
65 Dewey supports  his  theory  using  a  whole  series  of  historical  examples.  In  primitive
societies the familial  form of organization predominated over all  others.  In medieval
times religious principles tended to impose itself upon all domains of life. In the modern
era and in totalitarian states it  is  the political  principle which tends to dominate all
others. Then in contemporary life this function has been taken over by the economy.
Conflict emerges in these conditions as a consequence of frustration in the satisfaction of
the other basic human needs. 
66 Conflict can, therefore, be defined as a struggle among competing interests provided one
understands interests in terms of this anthropological structure of basic needs, as Dewey
does,  and  provided  one  understands  groups  as  the  social  bearers  of  these  universal
human interests. 
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67 Hence, at the cost of repetition, by conflict among competing interests Dewey does not
mean a conflict among the competing claims of different groups for scarce resources or
rival  versions  of  the  same  principle  (capitalists  against  workers,  catholics  against
protestants,  liberals  against  socialists,  men against  women,  black against  white),  but
conflict among rival principles each striving to organize social life in incompatible ways.
The  following  quotation  provide  one  example  among  many  others:  “During  the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the history of the progress of natural science is
largely a history of conflict of the interest in observation and inquiry with the better
established authority of the church” (Dewey 2015: III.5).
68 Because basic needs require social organization to be fulfilled,  Dewey claims that the
conditions  of  possibility  for  the  satisfaction  of  these  needs  depend  upon  the  social
circumstances within which human beings live.  Different social  groups are formed to
satisfy different basic needs, and they succeed in varying degrees. As a consequence of
this fact: “men’s various interests do not march four abreast, evenly and uniformly.” This
is because interests are advanced through the forms of their social organization. Hence
an interest’s chances of success depends, among other things, upon the form of social
organization it takes, from the types of institutional support it obtains etc. 
69 This is the original and for Dewey most profound source of social conflict. What happens
in fact is that: 
Some  interest  with  the  form  of  association  in  which  it  is  embodied  gets  a
particularly intense and widespread start; it then lords it over other interests and
associations and makes them tributary so far as may be to itself.  It insists upon
dominating activity, monopolizing attention and interest. (Dewey 2015: III.5)
70 The outcome of this process is, therefore, social imbalance, unequal fulfillment of human
basic interests, and in the end social suffering: 
A  mode  of  social  life  that  is  monopolistic  of  human  energy  and  attention,
comparatively speaking, necessarily becomes itself one-sided; it lacks the contact
which will give it fullness and an all-around character. It becomes at once harsh
and relatively empty, barren. (Dewey 2015: III.6)
71 In this context, Dewey never speaks of a conflict among social groups in a way that may
authorize us to think that the source of conflict may reside in the self-interest of group
members themselves. What comes into conflict are principles of social organization, and
in this context Dewey speaks of ‘the family principle’ and not of the family as a group.
Similarly, he uses the expression ‘scientific interest’ to refer to this more abstract level of
interest formation. The focus is really upon social groups viewed as the bearers of specific
basic  human  interests  and  tending  to  promote  the  interest  they  represent  to  the
detriment of other equally important universal human interests. 
72 Dewey’s social philosophy should, therefore, not be read as a theory of social domination,
but rather as a theory of social development, because the subject that suffers or flourishes
is, first of all, the entire society. Within this specific and very original perspective on
social conflict, Dewey develops his own version of social philosophy: 
In dealing then on the basis of theory with any particular social condition we need
first to ask what pattern of human association tends to be central and regulative;
what  are  the  one-sidednesses  and  arrests,  fixation  rigidities  thereby  produced;
where are the suppressions from which society is suffering in consequence; what
are the points of conflict, strife, antagonism of interest. (Dewey 2015: III.8)
73 Of a social situation in which a given principle comes to dominate the whole of social life,
Dewey writes: 
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Now obvious that all these things involve a one-sidedness and distortion of human
nature – suppression of growth in some direction, exaggeration in others. Lordship,
mastery, authority stimulated out of all properties in a few. The qualities that could
be developed only by direct share in associations for advance of intellectual life, art,
industry, religion, inhibited. Even as these forms of association grow up, they are
not free to grow; they have to accommodate themselves to habits carried over from
a prior dominate association. (Dewey 2015: III.11)
74 What  is  then,  for  Dewey,  the  great  social  problem  of  the  time?  Is  it  economic
exploitation? Is it the oppression of one class by another? They are not. We only need to
read the remarks closing the chapter on social conflict to have a clear grasp of his social
diagnosis: 
At  the  present  time,  the  need  for  social  philosophy  [is]  urgent  because  the
increased mobility of life has affected both the great principles of association. Old
forms  of  association  are  thrown  out  of  gear,  family,  church  political,  school,
because of the rapid development of industrial change. These also have brought
local groups into closer contact with each other increased sources of friction in
increasing  those  for  combined  action  and  cooperation.  Made  common
understanding more important and organization to perpetuate it. Critical state of
world. (Dewey 2015: III.12)
75 In light of this larger and more ambitious theoretical perspective, it is only at a second
and derivative level that conflict among organizing principles can be read as conflict
among the groups who represent and defend these principles and try to impose it upon
the whole of society: 
the practical difficulties which lie back of theoretical social problems are due to the
exaggerated development of some interest in a given type of society, the family, the
religious, the economic, that of personal acquaintance, the political or whatever.
This exaggerated development of some interest brings groups or classes of persons
into conflict with one another; it leads to friction[,] contention, strife and division,
and to confusion, disorder and uncertainty. (Dewey 2015: IV.1)
76 And again: 
For at some point the suppressed side of human interest, the instincts that have not
got expression and satisfaction come to consciousness, and they claim the right to
operate. And they are not abstract but are embodied in definite groups of persons.
There is no struggle between science and religion, between church and state, but
there  is  one  between  those  concrete  human  beings  who  exercise,  say,  the
controlling power through the church and other men and women whose instincts
to  investigate  and  discover  or  to  promote  secular  welfare,  or  achieve  political
power, are repressed and thwarted. (Dewey 2015: IV.1)
77 Only at an even more derivative level do we find the empirical fact of social conflict
among groups competing for access to scarce entitlements – rights or resources.  The
women’s movement, labour movements, anti-slavery movements are cases in point. And
yet again, as I will show later, this form of conflict is for Dewey legitimate and conducive
to social  emancipation only on condition that it  can be considered a struggle for re-
equilibrating opportunities for the full realization of all the human interests of society.
The humanist concern for development has priority over the sociopolitical concern for
equality. Equality is certainly a necessary condition for human flourishing. Yet for Dewey
this is only a small part of the picture, because in a world in which the economic principle
of social organization dominates all spheres of social life, even under conditions of strict
equality there human society cannot flourishing. 
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78 Indeed, equilibrated satisfaction of all the full array of human basic interests is more
important than equality in the satisfaction of one basic interest 
 
4. Lessons from the Comparison
4.1 Does Dewey Possess a Theory of Domination? 
79 This interpretation of social  conflict remains partially obscured in the version of the
Lectures in China that we have known so far, from which one might gain the impression
that Dewey’s social philosophy was mainly, or exclusively, concerned with relations of
social domination in which a given group prevents another from having legitimate access
to given entitlements. Indeed, many sentences in the crucial chapters on Social Conflict
and Social Reform are formulated in terms that emphasize conflict among social groups
striving  for  equality  in  the  distribution  of  entitlements,  rather  than  among  groups
representing competing basic needs. 
80 However, I do not wish to deny that Dewey had a clear sense of the reality of these types
of conflicts – something that also finds independent confirmation in other writings such
as the 1932 Ethics.4 Rather, my claim is that, by focusing upon the rather conventional
understanding of conflict and domination as qualifying relations of subordination among
groups with asymmetric  access  to resources,  we miss  the radical  content  of  Dewey’s
understanding  of  conflict  and  domination,  which  certainly  includes  this  form  of
domination, but which is indeed much broader and ambitious. As we have seen, this point
is largely obscured by the way in which the text was formulated.
81 Access to the original manuscript of the Lectures clearly shows that, for Dewey, group
domination is only a part – not the largest or the more important – of a much broader
theory of social conflict. A paradigmatic example of why readers relying on the previous
version have been misdirected is the following quotation: 
since a society is made up of many groups each of which is constituted on the basis
of at least one interest held in common by its members, social conflict is not, in any
real  sense,  conflict  between  the  individual  and  his  society,  but  rather  conflict
between classes,  occupational  groups,  or groups constituted along ideational,  or
perhaps even ethnic lines. (Dewey 1973: 65)
82 From this and several other similar quotations a reader may gain the impression that, for
Dewey, social conflict denotes essentially the conflict that arises when groups compete on
the basis of similar but opposed interests: two classes competing for scarce resources; two
nations fighting over a contested territory; two religious professions striving to maximize
the number of followers,  or two occupational groups such as farmers and merchants
competing for profit etc. Many other passages emphasize this group-based conception of
conflict and domination. Dewey speaks, for example, of the: “domination of ecclesiastical
organizations over other groups, largely because of the special respect and status that has
been accorded to them” (Dewey 1973: 67). Later in the text he says: “thus again we see the
results of one group in society gaining more power than is its just due, and so retarding
the development of other groups and other activities necessary to a healthy society”
(Dewey 1973: 69). At the end of the chapter we find the following sentence: “we need to
observe, first of all, the causes of social conflict, to find out what groups have become too
dominating and have come to exercise disproportionate power, as well as to identify the
groups that have been oppressed, denied privilege and opportunity” (Dewey 1973: 71).
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And then later again: “social conflict occurs when the interests of certain groups are
achieved to the disadvantage of other groups and to the suppression of their interests. A
disproportionately privileged position of certain groups at the disadvantage of others
constitutes injustice which generates conflict” (Dewey 1973: 72). Another formula is even
more striking: “in our present view social conflict occurs when one or more groups enjoy
a degree of freedom and rights which deprives other groups of their just due” (Dewey
1973: 73-4). And again: “in our theory, social conflict is a matter of groups in conflict –
and groups are, by definition social” (Dewey 1973: 74). 
83 From these passages one gets easily the impression that what Dewey means is that a
social  group directly or indirectly oppresses and dominates other groups in order to
promote its own self-interest, and that social conflict emerges out of these relations of
oppression and domination. And Dewey’s reference to women and workers’ movements
has  certainly  contributed to  this  interpretation.  These and similar  quotes  have been
invoked by readers to claim that Dewey’s Lectures in China present a materialistic theory
of domination which anticipates contemporary ones. 
84 The publication of the original manuscript of Dewey’s Lectures in China does not warrant
this interpretation. First, because none of the passages quoted above, nor others with a
similar  meaning,  can be  found in  the  original  manuscript.5 Second,  because  in  most
passages of the edition based upon the Chinese transcription, in which Dewey refers to
social conflict and group dynamics, the reference to basic needs as defining groups has
disappeared. This reference, as I  have shown, provides the core of Dewey’s theory of
conflict  in  the  original  manuscript.  Third,  because  the  terms  of  domination  and
oppression, which are widespread in the version based upon the Chinese transcription,
are seldom used in the text originally written by Dewey,  and always in milder,  non-
technical forms. Indeed, in the original text Dewey seldom refers to dominant groups or
to relations of domination in the sense of asymmetrical social relations of oppression
based upon personal convenience and privilege. 
85 As a consequence of these major semantic and conceptual differences between the two
texts, readers have felt justified in interpreting conflict not in terms of conflict among
basic  principles  (and  among  the  groups  in  which  they  are  embedded)  but  in  more
conventional terms of social  conflict:  whites against blacks;  men against women, and
elites against lower classes. For these reasons, recourse to the language of domination is
not appropriate to account for the variety of forms and causes of social conflict which,
according to Dewey, social philosophy should take into account. 
86 Dewey’s  social  philosophy  is  indeed  more  complex  precisely  because  its  organizing
principle lies at a more abstract level than that of interest-based group domination. The
central difference concerns the way in which Dewey understands conflict as the general
factor of social evolution. The conclusion that I wish to draw then is not that Dewey did
not consider material domination as a central concern, but only that in his project of a
normative foundation of social philosophy this type of domination plays only a limited
and indirect  explanatory role.  Indeed,  Dewey believes  that  the paradigmatic  form of
social  conflict  is  defined  by  the  clash  among groups  in  their  capacity  as  bearers  of
irreconcilable principles of social organization. 
87 This explains why Dewey always comes back to the example of the medieval conflict
between religious and scientific authority, and with the ensuing consideration that in
medieval  times  interests  associated  with  emotional  security,  knowledge,  power,  and
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material comfort were frustrated because the religious principle colonized all other social
spheres: 
Family life [was] affected because chastity was supposed to involve abstinence from
marriage,  the  celibate  life  superior;  industry,  because  wealth  and  material
production was a distraction from the spiritual life; science because the results of
free inquiry might be dangerous to theological doctrines of the church; art might
instill a love for the things of the eye and the flesh at the expense of divine things.
So these were allowed and cultivated only as they took a form subordinate to the
dominant religious interest; they had to be made to contribute in a one-sided way
to the supremacy of  the church – architecture,  music,  painting,  philosophy etc.
(Dewey 2015: III.4)
88 Dewey sees the predominance of a human interest over others as a general tendency in
the evolution of human societies, not as a specific pathology of modern times. Because of
the social dynamics which are needed to fulfill basic needs, human life is characterized by
the tendency of a principle to dominate others, hence to impede the fulfillment of other
equally  important  human  needs,  impoverishing  social  life.  Indeed  social  life  evolves
through the struggle of a principle: “to be central and regulative” (Dewey 2015: III.8). For
this reason, we can classify forms of social organization with reference to the principle
that regulates them: kinship in primitive societies; religion in the Middle age; politics in
the age of nation states and totalitarian states, and economy in capitalism. 
89 This dynamic model of social change gives pride of place to conflict because of the natural
tendency of each principle to affirm itself always at the expense of the others, with the
result  that  conditions  for  human fulfillment  become impoverished:  “all  these  things
involve a one-sidedness and distortion of human nature – suppression of growth in some
direction,  exaggeration in others” (Dewey 2015:  III.10).  For Dewey,  this one-sidedness
defines the paradigm of social pathologies and provides the normative benchmark for
social philosophy in her task of providing guidelines for social change. 
90 I conclude this section by comparing the two versions of a passage. This will provide
clearer evidence of the extent to which the editorial process undergone by the Lectures in
China has profoundly distorted Dewey’s ideas about social philosophy. The passage I refer
to instantiates a case of social conflict. In the original manuscript written by Dewey the
passage reads as follows: 
It  can  only  claim  that  certain  natural,  inherent  and  inalienable  claims  of
individuality  are  being  suppressed  by  the  exactions  of  convention  and  social
institutions. The social side of their aspiration may present itself only as a vague
utopian idealism, a passionate assertion of a new and redeemed society. Actually
they claim the right to assert individualism no matter what happens socially; they
become  rebels  against  society  while  in  truth  [they  are]  only  asking  for  social
reorganization,  which  will  make  the  relation  of  the  family  group  to  scientific,
literary,  religious,  industrial  and  political  groups  more  flexible,  less  frozen  and
rigid. (Dewey 2015: IV.6)
91 The  corresponding  passage  in  the  version  of  the  Lectures derived  from  the  Chinese
transcription reads as follows: 
Any movement then for  greater  freedom on the part  of  the young,  freedom to
select vocation, to choose their own mates, to make their own political affiliations,
to  determine their  own moral  and religious  beliefs  is  resented not  merely  as  a
conflict of personal wills, of one set of individuals over an another, but as an attack
of licentious individualism upon the foundations of society. As leading to lawless
individualism,  overthrowing  all  coherent  social  authority,  because  undermining
organization. On the other hand, the young, while they may feel a strong faith that
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the accomplishing of their desire for greater freedom would improve society and
put human relationships on a secured basis,  can not prove it  by pointing to an
established order where this state is realized. The demand to choose one’s job, to
elect one’s faith, to select one’s spouse, is in essence a demand for social equality,
for  equal  opportunity  for  free  development;  such  demand  seems  to  threaten
disaster for the simple reason that it has not yet been accorded sufficiently wide
public recognition by society at large. This is another illustration of the fact that
the interests of groups which are still  subordinate to the dominant groups, who
identify their own interests with those of their total society, are generally opposed
or disregarded – at least until the subordinate group grows large enough to enforce
its  demand that it,  too,  be recognized as an operating component of  the larger
society. (Dewey 1973: 76)
92 As we see, whilst the basic meaning of the text is the same, in the version derived from
the Chinese transcription the idea of equality has a priority than cannot be found in the
text originally written by Dewey, and the idea of groups as embodying basic interests is
lost.  From this and dozens of  other similar changes,  we have derived a false idea of
Dewey’s social philosophy and his theory of conflict. This process has probably rendered
Dewey’s social  philosophy more compatible with other social  philosophies,  but it  has
completely obscured the originality of Dewey’s views.
 
4.2 Recognition in Dewey’s Social Philosophy
93 The second pillar of mainstream interpretations of Dewey’s social philosophy which is
cast into doubt in the light of the newly discovered manuscript is the idea that in this text
Dewey develops a theory of recognition. Certainly the notion of recognition is present in
Dewey’s text, but the interpretive context which emerges from the publication of the
original manuscript does not warrant a strong interpretation of Dewey as a philosopher
of recognition. Certainly the Lectures in China derived from the Chinese transcription lend
themselves more easily to the impression that Dewey considered recognition to be the
motor of social life, based on a plurality of quotes in which Dewey explicitly refers to the
central political function of the social dynamics of recognition of oppressed groups. On
this basis,  Torjus Midtgarden (Midtgarden 2012) and Arvi Särkelä (Särkelä 2013) have
claimed that Dewey’s Lectures in China present a theory of conflict based upon the idea of a
struggle for recognition the subject of which are those social groups whose main interests
have been denied.
94 The publication of the original manuscript sheds new light on this perspective, showing
that conflict among social principles rather than among groups is for Dewey the motor of
social  life.  Social  groups,  as  we  have  seen,  are  involved in  struggles  for  recognition
because they are the bearers of principles referring to basic human needs, not because
they  have  suffered  personal  injustice.  In  that  sense,  the  normative  standard  against
which Dewey understands social change is not justice but human development. Whereas
standard interpretations of recognition are framed in terms of justice and consider that a
group is  dominated and unrecognized as  long as its  interests  are  suppressed to  the
advantage of other groups’ interests, Dewey’s starting point is that human interests as
such become frustrated,  and that the groups associated with them may (or may not)
happen to be marginalized or oppressed. Moreover, One should acknowledge that the
term ‘recognition’ is used by Dewey in the original manuscript only six times, and of
these only one instance can be referred to the theoretical  framework of  a theory of
recognition.  Moreover,  even  in  that  case  the  context  explains  that  Dewey  is
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reconstructing a fictive position he attributes to other thinkers. The passage reads as
follows: 
He is the propounder of a hypothesis that the welfare of society would be promoted
by the adoption of a certain change, that if this harms a special class for a time, this
loss  to  the  class  is  in  the  interests  of  the  community  of  the  whole,  and  is  the
measure  of  justice  to  some  other  class  now  suffering  from  inadequate  social
recognition. (Dewey 2015: III.13)
95 Similarly, while it is legitimate to see the germs of a theory of recognition in Dewey’s
three-stage model of social conflict, it should be clear by now that Dewey’s main concern
is not with the political relevance of recognition as a movement whereby oppressed social
groups overcome relations of domination, but rather as the process whereby a universal
human need comes to be acknowledged and then fulfilled. To this extent, one should
consider that, whereas the only examples of processes of recognition found in the text
based  on  the  Chinese  transcription  were  feminism and  the  labor  movement,  in  the
original text Dewey includes also the struggle between science and religion in Modern
Europe as an example of paradigmatic dynamics of social conflict. In this example, which
for Dewey stands on the same ground of the other two, recognition means that the search
for knowledge should be freed from subordination to religious authority. The object of
recognition are the basic human curiosity and desire for knowledge, and what is to be
recognized is the autonomy of science in the search for truth. Oppression, on the other
hand, is defined as the denial of this legitimate aspiration. The question of a supposed
injustice perpetrated against scientists, or of a lack of recognition of their standing, is
never raised by Dewey. 
96 Given this perspective, one should also notice that for Dewey young men in traditional
societies,  and scientific men in religious societies,  are even more misrecognized than
women, minorities, or exploited workers in our society. Recognition and misrecognition
has  primarily  to  do  with  social  principles  and  basic  interests  which  have  universal
import, in the same manner in which, for Dewey, social emancipation has mainly to do
with the successful satisfaction of the largest possible range of human interests for the
largest number of people. As he says with reference to youth movements, some of which
were very strong at the time he visited China, in their social protest these groups were
not asking for equal rights with elders or for recognition of their social worth. Rather,
they were: “asking for social reorganization, which will make the relation of the family
group to scientific, literary, religious, industrial and political groups more flexible, less
frozen and rigid” (Dewey 2015: IV.6). Once again, we see that the normative ideal which
guides Dewey’s social philosophy is always that of an integrated society in which there is
room for the realization of  a plurality of  human basic interests.  Similarly,  the social
worth of such a movement is seen in its propensity to improve a society’s capacity to
fulfill basic human interests and to avoid social compartmentalization. 
97 Only  at  a  theoretically  subordinate  level  does  Dewey  acknowledge  that  problems  of
recognition  or  domination  may  occur  when access  to  a  given  resource  is  unequally
conceded, so that part of the population is devoid of concrete opportunities to develop
their own personality and to fulfill their own needs and aspirations.
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5. The Normative Potential of Dewey’s Social
Philosophy
98 What in the end is the normative potential of Dewey’s social philosophy? What criteria of
social diagnosis and social evaluation can be derived from the social philosophy sketched
in the version of the Lectures in China originally drafted by him? In this last section I wish
to  suggest  that  the  normative  content  and  the  critical  potential  of  Dewey’s  social
philosophy are much stronger than usually understood, and that they reach far beyond a
more conventional understanding based upon ideas of domination and recognition. To
appreciate this point, I will first show that Dewey’s normative framework cannot easily be
reduced to mainstream approaches. The reason why such reductions fail is that they miss
the depth and radicalism of Dewey’s notion of conflict and hence fail to grasp the depth at
which his social philosophy analyzes social phenomena. 
99 As I have emphasized in my reconstruction of Dewey’s normative project, he thinks that
social  life  is  such  that  basic  human  needs  find  expression  in  principles  of  social
organization which in turn display a hegemonic tendency to colonize other spheres of
social life. This fact is in no particular way related to western modernity or to capitalism,
or dependent upon phenomena such as individual egoism or the oligarchic tendencies of
groups. 
100 This is, simply put, a mere fact of human associated life. Human beings have basic needs,
they associate to solve them and in so doing they form social aggregates which in turn
develop  institutions  to  fulfill  their  needs.  When  successful,  these  forms  of  social
organization tend to impose their organizational logic upon the totality of social life. And
in so doing they frustrate other basic human needs, whose realization conflicts with the
principle of social organization implemented by this or that form of social life. 
101 Hence  social  life  is  intrinsically  unstable  because  human  flourishing  requires  the
simultaneous fulfillment of a plurality of needs which give rise to incompatible claims about how
society should be organized in the same way as claims to rightness, to goodness, and to
virtue  give  rise  to  incompatible  moral  claims  at  the  level  of  individual  action.  The
humanistic ideal of a society in which human beings are given adequate opportunities to
develop  their  own  capacities  and  to  fulfill  their  needs  is  based  upon  the  idea  of  a
temporary  and  fragile  equilibrium  among  competing,  incompatible,  but  legitimate
instances.  Basic  human  needs  find  expression  in  social  organization,  basic  human
impulses find realization in human habits, and basic moral requirements find expression
in ways of behavior. 
102 There is a tragic sense in Dewey’s moral and social philosophy, a sense of the fragility of
the human condition due not only to external dangers and global insecurity, but also to
its own conflictual constitution. Hence the constant appeal to values of reconciliation and
integration,  meant  as  temporary,  fallible,  ever-changing states  of  equilibrium among
conflicting  tendencies.  Problems  of  domination,  oppression,  and  recognition  trouble
human  life  in  all  its  different  spheres  because  of  its  internal  complexity,  because
legitimate impulses and needs struggle to find an outlet and often fail, and in so doing
they  frustrate  the  possibility  of  realizing  human  potentialities. Dewey’s  normative
account has the whole of humanity in view, and begins from the assumption of a human
potential which is always insufficiently deployed. 
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103 In the context  of  this  enlarged understanding of  the scope of  social  philosophy,  the
original manuscript of the Lectures in China delivers at least three kinds of normative
criteria that  can be used to evaluate social  phenomena.  These criteria are organized
according to their relation to the anthropological model of basic human needs I have
reconstructed and display different degrees of generality, hence of theoretical priority.
Going from the most general and most important to the least general and least important,
we  can  say  that  a  social  conflict  has  emancipatory  potential  if  one  or  more  of  the
following conditions apply: (a) it contributes to the recognition of a basic human need
that has so far been frustrated; (b) it realizes a better integration of existing basic human
needs, and (c) it grants greater satisfaction of a given basic human need. 
104 (1)  The  first,  and  theoretically  prior,  set  of  normative  criteria  refers  then  to  the
recognition of a basic human need that has remained so far suppressed. There is social
emancipation any time a social group succeeds in providing new scope and legitimacy for
the realization of a human basic need. Emancipation is here conceived in abstract terms,
because  what  is  properly  emancipated  is  not  a  social  group  itself,  but  rather  the
organizing principle of which it is the bearer. This form of emancipation is for Dewey
paramount, and the majority of the examples discussed in the original manuscript of the
Lectures in China belong to this group. This interpretation of social conflict is used by
Dewey to paint a picture of human development in the course of its whole history, a
development which adumbrates a theory of human progress. The paradigmatic example
is that of scientists seen as a social group which succeeded in freeing the human desire
for knowledge from the domination of a religious principle which imposed an external
illegitimate  form  of  authority  on  it.  The  emancipation  of  a  political  form  of  social
organization from the traditional principle of kinship is another example, and democracy
provides the normative standard to assess the quality of this process.
105 (2) The second set of normative criteria to be found in the text refers to the capacity of a
social group to ameliorate the overall quality of social integration of the larger social
group to which it belongs. Here again the reference to social emancipation is the whole
society, and the normative criteria refers to its general capacity to adequately recognize a
plurality of basic human needs. Logically, this set of normative criteria is subordinated to
the first, because it does not refer to the recognition and advancement of a new set of
basic needs, but rather to the concrete re-equilibration in the social fulfillment of needs
that have already been recognized. 
106 In the original manuscript of the Lectures in China youth and women are taken by Dewey
as examples of this particular form of social emancipation. With reference to both, Dewey
explicitly states that these social groups act as the unconscious bearers of a universal
interest of humanity. Indeed, while at the superficial level they seem to fight merely to
resist  some  form of  personal  oppression  and  in  order  to  obtain  recognition,  this  is
however not the main reason why Dewey sees emancipatory potential in what they do.
Nor is their emancipatory potential explained in terms of the overcoming of states of
injustice. Rather, their action is positively valued because in so doing they increase the
level of social integration and promote the fulfillment of a larger array of basic human
needs. They concur with the human development of their society. 
107 The emancipatory contribution of feminism is seen by Dewey in its capacity to expand the
reach of the family principle to the whole society by: 
insuring that the humane and sympathetic interests and aims of the family which
have been the especial charge of women shall not be confined within the walls of
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the home, but shall  have a chance to [be] carried into schools,  shops,  factories,
professions,  politics  etc.,  and that the more impersonal,  abstract  and possessive
interest of the male shall no longer so dominate action as to set up barriers against
the free give and take of  social  groups and the interests  which they represent.
(Dewey 2015: IV.7)
108 In close to identical terms he praises the revolt of youth against old generations: 
they become rebels against society while in truth [they are] only asking for social
reorganization,  which  will  make  the  relation  of  the  family  group  to  scientific,
literary,  religious,  industrial  and  political  groups  more  flexible,  less  frozen  and
rigid. (Dewey 2015: IV.6)
109 (3)  The  third  type  of  normative  criteria  found  in  the  Lectures refers  to  the  more
conventional struggles conducted by groups which estimate that they have received an
unfair  share  of  a  given  entitlement,  be  it  respect,  recognition,  rights,  or  material
resources. This type of criteria operates at the level conventionally identified by theories
of domination, as it refers to relations among groups which have competing claims to a
single dimension, so that in most of the cases domination can be described in terms of
injustice, and normative requirements can be formulated in terms of equality or non-
discrimination: equality of women and men; equality of slaves and freemen; equality of
capitalists and workers, and non-discrimination of minorities. From the perspective of
the basic  normative framework of  Dewey’s  social  philosophy,  this  third type plays  a
theoretically even more subordinate function because it refers to struggles in contexts in
which the  legitimacy of  a  given normative  principle is  not  disputed.  In  the  original
version of the Lectures in China, only the workers’ movement belong to this group. 
110 It is important to note that these three types of criteria denote normative standards for
the analysis and assessment of social conflicts as they unfold in reality. This means that a
given social  phenomena may bear emancipatory potential  at  more than one of  these
levels. Hence the women and youth movements have also an emancipatory meaning in
the third sense. Yet their primal emancipatory meaning is defined in terms of the second
type of normative criteria, as Dewey’s text clearly shows.
111 Once again it  is  important  to note that  this  theoretical  reconstruction has no direct
political implications in terms of the intrinsic value of types of conflict. In no way does
Dewey assume or say that the third kind of struggle is politically less relevant or that the
claims advanced in its context are less important. Quite the contrary, here as well and in
several  other  texts  we have concrete evidence of  Dewey’s  concern for  the social  ills
produced by unequal distribution of resources. Yet from the theoretical vantage point of
a social philosophy and of its normative scope, these forms of social conflict become
intelligible only within a broader schema which inscribes them in a larger picture of
social  evolution considered as a process which should,  and could,  be oriented in the
direction of a fuller acknowledgment and fulfillment of basic human needs.
 
Conclusions
112 This  reconstruction  of  Dewey’s  social  philosophy  has  important  implications  for
understanding the normative potential of a pragmatist project in social philosophy. First,
it shows that Dewey’s project is much more ambitious than better known theories of
domination and recognition. Secondly, it bears unexpected similarities with the tradition
of Critical Theory.6 Not only, as it has been show elsewhere, Dewey’s theory of social
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conflict is consistent and compatible with the recognition,7 but it also bears unexpected
resemblance to Jürgen Habermas’ theory of the colonization of the lifeworld, and proves
to be consistent with a central intuition of this tradition, which is to say, the idea that
each sphere of social life should be governed by its own internal standards, and that
social  pathologies emerge once one criteria colonizes social  spheres which should be
organized according to other normative standards. 
113 There is  however an important difference.  Whereas for Habermas each social  sphere
should be governed by its own steering principle, for Dewey all the principles should as
far as possible be satisfied conjointly in all social spheres. To this extent, Dewey proposes
a  model  of  social  integration  rather  than  one  of  autonomization  of  social  spheres.
Moreover, it is precisely from the vantage point of its higher degree of abstraction that
Dewey’s social philosophy shows the closest affinities with the project of a critical theory
of  society,  as  here  Dewey  for  the  first  and  last  time  attempts  to  provide  concrete
normative  criteria  to  assess  social  phenomena  on  an  evolutionary  and  large-scale
perspective which, as I have shown, implies reference to a theory of social and moral
progress based upon a clear conception of human nature. 
114 Dewey’s  theory of  conflict  plays a  decisive function in this  context,  as  it  shows that
genuine conflict emerges once a given organizing principle such as personal attachment,
spirituality, power, knowledge/rationality, or money extends its normative reach to the
whole of society and impedes the equal satisfaction of the others. Most of the examples of
social conflict and failed recognition evoked by Dewey fall within this type of dynamic.
The conflict  between science and religion,  the dominance of  kinship and patriarchal
relations outside the familial sphere, the politicization of life under totalitarianism and
the generalization of business logic in capitalist societies all exemplify this social trend
which in the end has to be criticized not because it  produces social  domination,  but
because it impedes the realization of other basic human needs. 
115 Therefore, the publication of the original version of the Lectures in China provides new
evidence for the thesis that pragmatism, and Dewey’s variant in particular, developed an
original social and political philosophy which only at great loss can be reduced to either
one or the other contemporary competing traditions.  Whatever we may think of  the
concrete realizability of Dewey’s project, we have to acknowledge that his legacy lies in
the humanistic conception of social progress that he developed consistently throughout
his pedagogy, his moral theory, his anthropology, and his politics. The discovery of the
original manuscript of the Lectures in China confirms this interpretation and enables us to
extend it to a domain of his thought that has so far received insufficient attention – his
social philosophy.
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NOTES
1. As is known, the Lectures in China have so far been available only in translation from Chinese to
English of the transcription of the oral communication. See the Note to the critical edition for a
description of the manuscript, including a list of the lectures that have been preserved and those
that  are  missing.  See  Yung-chen  Chiang’s  paper  in  this  Symposia  for  an  evaluation  of  the
differences between the two editions.
2. See for example LW 3: 41-54, LW 11: 1-65, LW 13: 63-188, and LW 15: 261-76.
3. For  a  slightly  different  interpretation  of  this  transition  in  Dewey’s  thought,  see  Roberto
Gronda’s paper in this Symposia.
4. LW 7: Chapter 16.
5. We should note that, while the newly discovered manuscript is incomplete, the text of the
chapters on “Social Conflict” and “Social Reform” has come to us in its complete form.
6. For a fuller account, see Frega 2013.
7. For a fully articulated account of this point, see in particular Richter 2008. For an analysis
which refers more specifically to the Lectures in China, see Sarkela 2013, Midtgarden 2012.
ABSTRACTS
This paper provides a fresh examination of John Dewey’s social philosophy in the light of new
evidence made available  by the recent  discovery of  the original  manuscript  Dewey wrote  in
preparation of the Lectures on Social and Political Philosophy delivered in China and published here
for the first time. The paper reconstructs Dewey’s ambivalent relationship with social philosophy
throughout his long career and focuses upon his attempt between 1919 and 1923 to develop his
own’s social philosophy. It proceeds to examine the contribution of the Chinese Lectures in Social
and Political Philosophy to Dewey’s project in social philosophy and shows that our understanding
of Dewey’s social philosophy was severely hampered by the unavailability of the original text. It
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